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An autobiographical context for the portfolio of evidence  
The research on armed non-state actors in southern Africa that comprises this portfolio 
started in 1984-85 while in Mozambique and becoming intrigued by conversations with key 
Mozambican government officials, such as the late Fernando Honwana and Aquino de Bragança 
(advisers to President Machel but killed in 1986 with Machel in the air crash) – and with diplomats 
who struggled to explain the spreading Mozambican civil war. This convinced me that the Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) was more than solely a puppet of South African destabilisation 
and required research. Encouraged by Landeg White (Director of the Centre for Southern African 
Studies, University of York), I began researching on RENAMO in 1986, trying to understand why this 
rebel group was becoming so successful militarily in Mozambique and how it was evolving overtime. 
This took me to Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, Portugal, Italy and the United States. I 
received small grants from the Centre for Southern African Studies, the Catholic Institute of 
International Relations (now Progressio), the Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford University, Africa 
Watch (now Human Rights Watch), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the 
British American Security Information Council. 
I interviewed RENAMO leaders, refugees, intelligence and policy makers, diplomats, NGO 
workers, faith leaders, journalists and academics during the period 1987-91 and am fluent enough in 
Portuguese to not use interpreters.  In 1992, I joined Human Rights Watch and continued to visit 
Mozambique, working on post-conflict justice issues and DDR and in 1994 I served as an election 
observer in Gaza province for Mozambique’s first presidential and parliamentary elections for the 
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ).   
After 1992, though continuing to follow RENAMO, my professional focus shifted to Angola. I 
first visited Angola in September 1992 for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM 
II) to monitor the presidential and multiparty elections. I had already experienced the União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), including meeting its leader Jonas Savimbi and his 
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delegation in 1991 in London following the Bicesse accords. Human Rights Watch in 1994 sent me to 
Angola to write a report on violations of laws of war and this resulted in time in UNITA controlled 
areas. I subsequently specialised in Angola’s civil war for Human Rights Watch and to this day 
regularly visit the country and meet with government, UNITA and civil society.  
In addition to Human Rights Watch, the Catholic Institute of International Relations, Ford 
Foundation, DFID, the Danish government, the Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford University and 
the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London, funded research on Angola that included 
UNITA. I was intensively engaged on Angola research from 1992 to 2000. My appointment to the UN 
Panel of Experts on Liberia in 2001 was due to my publications on the failure of UN sanctions on 
Angola. From 2001-08 my focus was mostly on West Africa for the UN but I continued to oversee 
research and meetings of the Angola Forum at Chatham House. I was commissioned by the 
Department of War Studies, King’s College to produce papers on UNITA’s post-conflict reintegration 
in Angola (drawing on field work in Angola in 2005 for DFID) and on RENAMO’s post-conflict 
reintegration (also drawing on additional field work in Mozambique in 2010 for DFID).  
A chronological description tracing the development of the portfolio of evidence  
My interest in armed non-state actors started in Mozambique in 1984, when I witnessed the 
spread of RENAMO and was forced to drive in armed convoy because of rebel attacks. By 1990 
RENAMO were attacking regularly the suburbs of Mozambique’s capital Maputo and I witnessed 
attacks for Africa Watch. My interest deepened during my first visit to Angola in 1992 for the 
elections there and my sense that post-Cold War these movements (UNITA and RENAMO) were 
changing and could not be dismissed as solely puppets of apartheid.  I was interested in their agency, 
their ambitions and following the 1994 elections in Mozambique and the Lusaka Peace Accord in 
Angola, how these rebel groups might transform and become non-armed opposition parties.  
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My analysis on RENAMO and UNITA was helped by being a member of the UN Panel of 
Experts on Liberia from 2001-03 and from 2005-07, Chair of the UN Group of Experts on Côte 
d’Ivoire. During this sojourn in West Africa, I saw at first hand armed non-state actors such as the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in Liberia, in addition to the Charles 
Taylor regime and the Forces Nouvelles (FN) in Côte d’Ivoire. This provided an empirical comparison 
to what I have observed in southern Africa in Angola and Mozambique, confirming that there are 
greater similarities between the development of RENAMO and UNITA due to Rhodesian and 
apartheid South African support, rather than the primarily resource driven predatory warlordism of 
the Mano River Union. This raised the overall question as to whether armed rebel groups can 
successfully be transformed into peaceful democratic opposition parties. With the end of the Angola 
and Mozambique civil wars, research became easier, although the resumption of limited conflict in 
Mozambique in 2013-14 highlighted the fragility of peace. The August 2014 agreement between 
RENAMO and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) is a reminder that Mozambican 
politics differs from that of Angola.  In this portfolio I seek for the first time in my published work to 
draw out methodological and empirical learning from both countries. 
An evaluative description of the contribution made by the portfolio of evidence to the subject or 
discipline area and any subsequent developments since the work was completed, including 
published reviews of any of the submitted works and/or evidence of citation frequency of the 
submitted works   
My portfolio consists of: 
 one single authored book (two editions – 2nd was updated); 
 two single authored published peer reviewed journal articles; 
 one single authored published monograph; 
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 a joint authored peer reviewed book chapter (which was updated from a published peer 
reviewed journal article). 
1a. Vines, A. (1991) Renamo: terrorism in Mozambique. London: James Currey, 176pp.  
This is the only comprehensive study of the rebel movement from its creation in 1977 and 
1991. It was the first publication to fully demonstrate that RENAMO was Mozambican even if it 
was originally created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office (CIO) in 1977 and was foster 
parented by apartheid South Africa’s Directorate of Special Tasks (DST) in 1980. A 2nd edition of 
this book was published in 1996 (now out of print) and  benefitted from adding an analysis of 
RENAMO’s transformation from rebel group to opposition party in Mozambique and the 1994 
multiparty election results. It also drew on the author’s freedom to travel in Mozambique, 
including as an UN official in 1994.   
The 1st edition challenged the popular thesis at the time that Mozambique’s civil war derived 
predominately from external destabilisation through RENAMO as a proxy force. It also tried to 
explain that RENAMO was a successful rebel movement, that it had limited secure government 
presence to the towns even if it used widespread violence and that it had limited popular 
support.   
The book was widely used by policy makers and academics to understand RENAMO 
structures and ambitions.  The UN Special Representative to Mozambique (1993-95) Aldo Ajello 
acknowledged to me in September 2008 at a Center for Conflict Resolution Seminar in 
Stellenbosch that this book assisted him in designing his strategy to dismantle RENAMO’s 
command and control structure and was the first thing he read when accepting his appointment. 
According to Google Scholar the 1st edition of Renamo enjoyed 229 citations, many in key peer-




Paul Moorcraft in the Journal of Southern African Studies in 17 (4), 786 highlighted how this 
book broke new ground and challenged existing academic orthodoxy. He wrote:  
 Recently, the academic community, increasingly and grudgingly, has come to accept 
Renamo’s credentials. Now Alex Vines’s new book, Renamo: Terrorism in 
Mozambique cuts through the centre of lumbering dinosaurs. His account is one of 
the most balanced to emerge in recent years: a one–stop handbook on all you ever 
wanted to know about Renamo.  
James Sidaway in the Third World Quarterly 13 (3), 567-568 also highlights this paradigm 
shift: 
Vines’ book is a statement of what has effectively been a wider paradigm shift in 
Mozambican studies. Much greater emphasis is now placed on the prior internal factors which 
external destabilisation catalysed to produce such a destructive and protracted war. Vines however 
keeps this in perspective. 
Meanwhile Foreign Affairs 17 (2), 214 in a review by Gail Gerhart highlights the book’s 
contribution, but recognises it is not definitive:  
Vines’ non polemical history of the murderous Renamo rebels pulls together many of 
the factual strands that must eventually form part of a balanced assessment, 
although he concedes that he has not fully fathomed the sociological reasons for the 
movements durability. 
William Gutteridge, in his review in the Conflict Bulletin of the Research Institute for Study of 
Conflict and Terrorism, in July 1991 highlighted the tension in the book trying to understand the use 
of violence and how RENAMO had become so successful: 
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 [it] contains much new information about Renamo, in particular its internal 
structure and dimensions. His range of sources, including personal interviews with 
rebels, is impressive. He attempts to reconcile the two views of Renamo that on the 
one hand it depends on terror and has little in the way of ideology but at the same 
time is a military organisation with up to 20,000 combatants with a centralised 
leadership. It is not just an alliance of bandits and warlords.  
Margaret Hall in African Affairs 91 (363), 285 likewise highlighted the book’s contribution to 
understanding RENAMO’s structure and coherence but also the group’s handicap of lacking any real 
political identity:  
Vines stresses that external destabilization on its own is insufficient explanation for 
Mozambique’s problems and seeks in his own words to demonstrate that Renamo is 
a real military-based organization and not – as is sometimes depicted – a loose 
collection of warlord bands. However, the message that comes through from the 
facts presented is slightly different. While these do demonstrate beyond any 
reasonable doubt Renamo’s coherence as a military force inside Mozambique, the 
theme of external direction and external interference runs strongly throughout two 
of his three main chapters. Clearly Renamo’s failure to develop a political identity of 
any substance is intimately linked to the actions of these external forces and the 
internal tensions they have generated. 
 
Anthoni van Nieuwkark in the Journal of Contemporary African Studies 10 (2), 97-98 also 
focussed on this aspect of the book, but draws out that RENAMO’s only motivation is to force an elite 
negotiation for power-sharing: 
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Vines tries to put a perspective on his work. As previously mentioned, he argues that 
Renamo is a real military-based organisation, not an umbrella for numerous groups 
of uncoordinated “armed bandits”, or loosely aligned warlords. However, Renamo is 
devoid of a clear, well-thought-out political philosophy. These are important points 
because of their implications for the current efforts to negotiate an end to the 
war….Nor is Renamo a coherent political force. Although its external wing has in the 
past formalised a political agenda, the Renamo set-up inside Mozambique has been 
little concerned with the wider issue of politics, conceptualising them within a 
localised rural context. The one issue uniting Renamo, Vines argues, has been the 
search for a share of power with Frelimo. 
Keith Somerville in International Affairs 68 (1), 198 is more negative in his review finding the 
research detail overwhelming. He writes: 
 the author also gets so minutely involved in day-to-day events and individuals that it 
is hard in the absence of clear conclusions, to piece the whole puzzle together. But 
for determined academics and researchers it is a mine of information, if they have 
the time to sift through the debris  
Kathleen Sheldon in Africa Today 39 (1/2), 139-141 disagrees with the book’s main thesis 
that there is a Mozambican spine to RENAMO and says it is an ‘incomplete analysis’ as it 
misunderstands apartheid South Africa’s agenda and tactics via its proxy:  
 
the book appears to be a rebuttal to analyses that have focused on the central role 
of the apartheid regime in fomenting strife in Mozambique. Thus while Vines does 
provide the history of South African involvement, his emphasis is on how Renamo 
found support in the villages of Mozambique. The unanswered question is this: if 
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Renamo has so much support in the rural areas, why must they kidnap and recruit 
forcibly? Why use the tactics of terror if they have a political agenda that 
Mozambicans might accept? A serious analysis of Renamo must deal with these 
issues….A second serious analytical problem is that Vines does not make the 
connection between Renamo attacks on schools and health posts (in fact he barely 
mentions these attacks) and South Africa’s desire to control the regional economy. 
This can best be explained by recognizing “imperialism as a system articulating 
external and internal forces” . 
William Minter in The International Journal of African Historical Studies 28 (3), 613-617 saw 
the book’s strength mainly for its empirical contribution. He writes: 
 The strength of the Vines’ work is his diligent and energetic fact-gathering. There 
are a few minor lapses, likely to be corrected in the promised second edition. 
The South African press also highlighted the book. The Sunday Times on 27 October 1991 in 
a review by Mike Miller and Hilary Anderson in the Weekly Mail, November 22 to 28, 1991 wrote that 
‘this encyclopedic little book is remarkable for both its honest approach and its density. It fully 
deserves the title which it is earning in Britain and America – “the handbook to Renamo”’. And Gerald 
Shaw in the Cape Times on 29 January 1992 wrote ‘although an unpretentious preliminary study, this 
is a good book, balanced and measured in its judgements. It should be read by all South Africans who 
believe in accountable government – as an object lesson in what can happen when a cult of military 
secrecy and clandestine operations goes out of control.’ António De Figueiredo in Portugal’s Jornal de 
Noticias in January 1992 highlighted the books objectivity and that those wanting peace in 
Mozambique needed to read it. The UK’s Africa Analysis on 26 July 1991 in its review concludes, 
‘Vines..provides a uniquely useful light on Renamo’s murky origins and the means by which it 
manages to sustain itself’.   
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1b. Vines, A. (1996) Renamo: from terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? 2nd edn. Oxford: James 
Currey, 209 pp. 
This 2nd edition benefited from additional archival and field research including in RENAMO 
controlled zones. It contains two new chapters and updates. The key argument of this second edition 
is that RENAMO was far better disciplined than the government forces and that its success as an 
armed rebel group drew on regional and ethnic identities. It also highlighted the difficulties that 
RENAMO would face in peace time, lacking skilled cadre and resources to effectively challenge the 
governments hegemony. 
René Pélissier in a review article, ‘Amazing Travellers, Strange Countries’, in the Journal of 
Southern African Studies 22 (4), 665 concludes that the book highlighted the puzzle that Renamo did 
well in the 1994 elections despite its violent record.  He wrote: 
Vines’ book is honest and that it goes well beyond propaganda to explain that – despite its 
recent past and the weaknesses of its organisational perspectives – it is not by chance that 
Renamo won the majority of seats in five out of eleven provinces in the October 1994 
elections. 
Richard Synge in the Journal of Refugee Studies 10 (2), 213 concluded that in the second 
edition the analysis demonstrated that international mediation and particularly the UN played a vital 
role in ensuring peace continued. He wrote:  
The beginning of Renamo’s conversion into a more respectable political entity can be 
traced through the negotiating process, whereby churches, business interests and 
interested governments (both in the region and in the West), encouraged the 
movement to express itself in terms that elevated it from the bush context in which it 
had previously operated. Vines shows how this conversion was intensified and 
encouraged by the United Nations’ peace operation between 1992 and 1994, 
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particularly through financial incentives offered to Renamo leaders for their 
compliance.  
Steve Kibble in his review in International Relations 13 (3), 78-80 also highlighted the central 
paradox that RENAMO was centralised, violent and yet won significant votes in the 1994 elections. 
He wrote:  
At the heart of this revised edition there is an interesting paradox. This is that the 
centralisation of Renamo was understated in the first edition while, simultaneously, 
insufficient regard was paid to the profound local differences in practice that characterised 
(and continue to characterize) Renamo’s operations. The first is illustrated by the fact that 
the insurgency stopped everywhere almost immediately in 1992. For the second we are 
directed to Renamo’s very different practice in terms of terror and destruction or acceptance 
of local customs in northern, central and southern areas of Mozambique. A further aspect 
concerns the very localized election results. These do not necessarily correlate with differing 
Renamo practice and certainly cannot be subsumed by simplistic ethnic explanation. 
2. Vines, A. (1998) ‘Disarmament in Mozambique’. Journal of Southern African Studies 24 (1), 191-
205 
This paper took the research beyond the civil war in Mozambique to the immediate post-
conflict disarmament phase. Based on field research in Mozambique in 1994 and 1995 it focused on 
the UNOMOZ’s main failure during its mandate to conduct meaningful disarmament. This paper 
benefitted from my interviews with ex-combatants in Assembly Areas describing how they saw their 
weapons as insurance policies and also highlighted the lack of trust in local institutions, especially the 
police. 
The paper argued that to disarm all individuals would have been impossible but the UN 
should have destroyed the weapons it had obtained and earmarked for decommissioning. Its analysis 
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found that UNOMOZ’s failure was linked to its weak mandate that did not spell out what 
disarmament required and the criteria for success. However it concluded that post UN-disarmament 
was more successful since mine action organisations and faith groups played an important role. It 
found, further, that over this period whereas hidden arms caches became less of an internal threat, 
transit smuggling of small arms and light weapons to South Africa became a greater problem. The 
paper demonstrated that disarmament is an open-ended process and should not just be seen, as was 
typical at that time as a technical intervention and that its success depends on politics and 
communities sense of security.  
This article was cited according to Google Scholar in over 20 peer-reviewed journal articles and 
monographs and books. 
With hindsight it became apparent that though the article correctly identified that disarmament 
was a political process, it assumed like others that over time the weapons from the conflict would 
degrade and not pose a renewed threat in Mozambique.  Only later did I assess poor stockpile 
management (Vines 2007). Nor did I or others then anticipate that in 2013 RENAMO would 
remobilize and that hidden stockpiles provided the ex-rebels weapons to conduct limited conflict.  
3. Vines, A. (1999) Angola Unravels: the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process. New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 205pp 
Having researched Mozambique’s civil war and post-conflict interventions it was a natural 
progression to consider the parallel processes going on in Angola. This 200 page monograph covering 
the 1995-8 peace process is based primarily on fieldwork in Angola, Zambia and South Africa 
between 1995 and 1999. Additional field work was gathered in Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, France, the Netherlands and the US in 1998 and in South Africa and Zambia in 1999. It included 
interviewing government officials, UNITA rebels, refugees in Zambia and internally displaced in 
Angola. It also included visiting areas controlled by UNITA, and the quartering areas. 
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Angola Unravels also investigated why both sides returned to all-out war despite significant 
international support including by two UN peacekeeping missions, UNAVEM III and its successor, the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). It concluded that the failure was not simply, as 
others had claimed, due to the bad faith of UNITA. Rather, it offered an alternative analysis that 
suggested that the UN’s strategy of refraining from disclosure of public action against violations of 
the accords, its lack of transparency, and its failure to implement UN embargoes undermined any 
respect that UNITA or the government had to observe the Lusaka Protocol.  
This research fed into several processes – one was the tightening of UN embargoes on 
UNITA, another was the creation of the Kimberley process on conflict diamonds – which Human 
Rights with Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada were encouraging. When the monograph 
was published, it attracted widespread media attention.  In the feature, ‘Making Money out of 
Angola’, The Economist – 18 September 1999 - highlighted that the monograph ‘documents the 
multiple failings of the UN peace process, putting forward more sophisticated theories about who is 
to blame for the resumed fighting. The rebels and the government are roundly condemned. But the 
UN itself comes in for quite a pasting’. 
         While Gail M. Gerhart in Foreign Affairs 79 (4) stated that: 
sustained by bountiful deposits of oil and diamonds and prolonged by inept politicians and 
their corrupt international accomplices, Angola's civil war now lurches into its 26th year. This 
report recounts the failures of the Angolans and the United Nations to consolidate the peace 
process begun by the Lusaka accord of November 1994, detailing the abuses committed by 
the warring parties since that date. Although rightly placing most of the blame for Angola's 
nightmare on Jonas Savimbi, the report also underscores the repeated inability of the U.N. to 
intervene decisively, take human rights violations seriously, or enforce its own sanctions. 
After backing Savimbi's ruinous ambitions for a decade and a half, the United States changed 
sides in the early 1990s and has since supported the peace effort. The report finds that had 
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foreign governments and the U.N. done less to placate elites and more to encourage civil 
society, Angolans would have suffered less. 
      René Pélissier in the Journal of Southern African Studies 26 (3), 573-582 noted that:  
the reader can at least be assured of a work based on an extensive exploration and 
exploitation of all (or most) the sources of information, both oral and written, which the 
author has been able to collate from ten different countries (but not including Portugal) from 
1995 to 1999. Vines works like a vacuum cleaner, but he is sufficiently up on his subject 
material to provide the necessary coherence to this unrivalled collection of source materials. 
From his classification of the materials and from his conclusions, the picture which emerges is 
that of colossal failure on the part of both Angolan politicians and generals on the one hand, 
and of the international community on the other. 
      Patrick Chabal in his review for Portuguese Studies 16, 301-302 observed that: 
These chapters are clearly written and highly informative, based as they are on first-hand 
accounts or identifiable documents. They provide much useful information about the 
unravelling of the peace process.  
      Despite some general reservation he believed: 
The greatest strength of Angola Unravels is the meticulous attention devoted to the clear 
presentation of properly documented evidence. It is particularly impressive in the detail it 
provides on the range of atrocities perpetrated by both sides and on the sanction busting as 
well as embargo violations that have taken place. The data presented in the book makes it 
clear that the war is continuing in Angola primarily because neither side believes that peace 
is a better alternative.  
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Meanwhile Norrie MacQueen in the Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (1), 173-174 
questioned the central thesis of the monograph that human rights violations ‘by both sides in the 
conflict – and more especially their disregard by the international community – have been a major 
factor in the failure of the peace process’. Nevertheless he concedes that:  
the report provides an excellent narrative history of a situation, the unfolding of which has 
been as complex as it has been horrific….Inevitably, some fundamental questions are 
suggested, but remain unanswered (and are probably unanswerable). Perhaps the most 
fundamental is simply whether or to what extent the Angola situation is amenable to 
externally driven resolution. 
Chester Crocker writing in The World Today 56 (1), 23 echoed these concerns over being over 
reliant on a human rights methodology to analyse the collapse of the Lusaka peace process writing 
that the monograph:  
sheds welcome light on the dismal human rights picture in a country controlled by birth by 
factional elites who are unaccountable to anyone. Approximately half of the volume eloquently 
documents the human rights and humanitarian results of their leadership…. While it sharply 
criticises the human rights conduct of both sides, the book clearly treats UNITA and its leader 
Jonas Savimbi as the party that has done the most to block peace. Other observers might point to 
a more complex history involving an imposed peace, an imperfectly implemented or enforced set 
of external constraints, and an increasingly tilted playing field. Those factors have had the sad 
but predictable consequence of driving the weaker side into isolation and irrational behaviour.  
   Steve Kibble though in his review in International Relations 63 (6), 63-65 highlighted that: 
Vines’ account is well-researched particularly on the details of the violations of arms embargoes 
and human rights including sexual oppression and media censorship, and the regional 
dimensions of the conflict…. Vines is perhaps more useful for a broader understanding, not least 
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in bringing out the negative lessons to be learnt - the cost of ignoring human rights violations, of 
failures to ensure compliance with the peace agreements and of the distrust of both sides for 
each other. 
4. Vines, A. and Oruitemeka, B. (2009) ‘Beyond bullets and ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in 
Angola’. In Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict. ed by. Berdal, M. and Ucko, B.  Abingdon: 
Routledge Studies in Intervention and Statebuilding, 199-224 
(This peer reviewed book chapter is updated from a peer reviewed journal article of Vines, A. and 
Oruitemeka, B. (2008) Conflict, Security and Development 8 (2), 241-265. 
From the peace process in Angola my research turned to the political transformations in the 
new post-conflict democracy. Based on field work in Angola in 2005, this article charted the fortunes 
of the former rebel movement UNITA and assessed how successfully it had transformed itself from a 
rebel movement into the leading opposition party and what its future prospects are. This research 
entailed analysis of government documents interviews with UNITA demobilised and built upon earlier 
publications especially the work of Porto, Parsons and Alden (2007). Its primary aim was to see how 
successfully UNITA ex-combatants had reintegrated. 
The paper argued that following military defeat UNITA faced problems similar to other 
political opposition parties in Africa. It found few signs that UNITA is particularly disadvantaged by its 
violent past, though the lost seats in the 2008 legislative elections did mean lost revenue. This paper 
showed that despite the length of the conflict and military defeat, UNITA ex-combatants re-
integrated surprisingly successfully into their communities and that the Angolan government needed 
NGO support to assist their efforts. It did not however predict that UNITA would regain seats in the 




The original article in Conflict, Security and Development has been cited in a number of peer 
reviewed journals.  
5. Vines, A. (2013) ‘Renamo’s Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique’. 
International Peacekeeping 20 (3), 375-393 
To conclude the research I returned to Mozambique to review the years following the 
disarmament period to see how the reintegration process of RENAMO had fared. It found that in 
Mozambique a ‘pay them and scatter’ approach to demobilization and reintegration had actually 
worked well. Notwithstanding a patchy and incomplete disarmament process, some 20 years after 
the civil war ended the research found that, ‘many RENAMO combatants have successfully 
reintegrated’, and the group ‘does not have the capacity to return to war’ (Vines 2013: 390). 
During those years RENAMO contested four presidential and parliamentary elections, 
becoming the largest opposition party in Africa until 2002. However, since then, it has been less 
successful due to exclusion politics by the party of government FRELIMO and because of tactical 
mistakes by Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO’s leader since 1980. The research found that Dhlakama’s 
leadership was critical in bringing an end to the conflict and delivering RENAMO’s demobilisation, but 
that he was unable to tactically change from a guerrilla mentality. It concluded that Dhlakama’s 
decision to return to rural central Mozambique in late 2012 and the armed violence that followed in 
2013 was out of political desperation. The analysis suggested that RENAMO lacks the support or 
resources to return to civil war, and a splinter party, Movimento Democrático de Moçambique 
(MDM) has benefitted. This paper is the first to contextualise and explain RENAMO’s tactical decision 
to return to limited armed conflict in 2013-14 and to explain not only leadership deficiencies and 
poor elite re-integration, but the political challenge from MDM. 
Between its publication date on 7 November 2013 and 7 August 2014, the article has been 
viewed 176 times. Chris Cramer from SOAS tweeted on 15 November 2013, ‘Alex Vines’ piece on 
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Renamo and politics of reintegration in Mozambique - interesting in light of recent clashes’(Cramer 
2013). The article generated significant debate in Mozambique following a feature about it by 
Gustavo Mavie, ‘Académico britânico denuncia Dhlakama’ in the main daily state-owned newspaper, 
Notícias on 10 June 2014 (Mavie 2014). This article took a pro-Frelimo slant and was used to buttress 
the government’s negotiating position with RENAMO. It resulted in a significant debate on blogs and 
in the social media such as on Face Book and an increase of requests for the article including from 
negotiators, mediators of the peace talks, diplomats, business people and academics.  
A description, synthesis and evaluation of any links between the outputs and the development of 
the portfolio of evidence. 
The topic of African rebel movements in general has attracted a body of academic writing 
but much of the theorizing and analysis has drawn from the Horn of Africa, West Africa and Central 
Africa rather than Angola and Mozambique, and most of it has ignored their relationship to the 
democratic process.  
An early key text was Clapham’s edited volume on African Guerrillas (Clapham 1998: 7). 
There he sought to define four broad groups, liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, reform 
insurgencies and warlord insurgencies.  He categorises UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in 
Mozambique as warlord insurgencies. Unlike in West Africa, or in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), one can distinguish UNITA after Angola’s independence  in 1975 and RENAMO on 
ideological grounds from the governments they opposed, both offering pro-Western, capitalist and 
democratic credentials that were designed to attract external backing. As my work records, however, 
Clapham is wrong in arguing that this handicapped them. UNITA in 1992 won significant votes and 
forced an arranged presidential run-off (though it never occurred) and RENAMO had surprisingly 
good results up to the 1994 and 1999 elections and in 1999 came within a small margin of winning 
the presidential vote (some believe they actually won).  
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There has in recent years been a growing body of research building on the work of scholars 
such as Duffield (1998), MacKinlay (2000), Reno (2000), who foremost have focused their attention 
on explaining the appearance of warlords and other scholars who have examined what characterises 
such military leaders and the possibilities of using them as an alternative form of governance in failed 
states (Jackson 2003 and MacKinlay 2000).  Many of these scholars have focused on war-to-peace 
transitions, but they have not included the democratic process into their analysis. Much of the recent 
literature has focused on warlords as military spoilers (Beswick 2009), how peacemakers can induce 
or force such elites to support peace (MacKinlay 2000; Martern 2013; Peake et al 2005)  and the 
difficulties of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combtants (DDR) in societies where 
warlords continue to hold power (Bhatia and Muggah 2009). 
Analysis of what has occurred in Angola and Mozambique in particular is scarce in this 
literature although Manning (2002: 19) has argued that post-conflict democratization in Mozambique 
is in effect ‘a process of protracted elite bargaining that occurs within and outside of formal 
democratic institutions’.  In Mozambique the decision to introduce multi-party politics was the result 
of elite bargaining between the party of government, the FRELIMO and RENAMO, incentivised by a 
number of factors, such as conflict fatigue and especially international donor pressure.   
In addition, the trajectories of RENAMO and UNITA are also different from one another, 
again showing the limitations of using Clapham’s categories. UNITA leader Savimbi rejected the 
multiparty election results in 1992 and returned to war before being forced by battlefield setbacks to 
seek a further truce and power sharing in 1994. He was later to return to war and was killed in 
conflict in March 2002. Savimbi tried through armed conflict to take over the recognized 
governments, but failing this created a quasi-government that tried to replicate the state. My 
research for Angola Unravels but also more recent field research by Pearce (2013) has shown 
Clapham to be correct in this regard. Savimbi believed also that he could capture the Angolan state 
through returning to war, very different from RENAMO’s Dhlakama – who saw violence as a tool to 
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facilitate elite bargaining. Hence despite the peace agreement that RENAMO signed in 1994 and its 
participation in elections, it returned to limited armed conflict in early 2013 in order to extract 
concessions during 74 rounds of talks with the Mozambican government that has resulted in a new 
agreement in August 2014. 
My contribution to this scholarship has been to show how UNITA and RENAMO have 
adapted their strategies over time as opposition parties within the democratic processes.  This is not 
a linear process and as highlighted above there are significant differences between RENAMO and 
UNITA. My research in particular illustrates the agency of both armed groups to determine their 
political future by the early 1990s and the limitations on international engagement to support the 
end of both conflicts.  My research in Angola and Mozambique also highlights that within the 
literature on post-war democratization and peace building there has been an analytical failure to 
assess whether and how ex-guerrilla leaders can become peaceful democrats. Although much is 
written about post-war democratization, scholars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; 
Manning 2004; Söderberg Kovacs 2007) have overlooked the possibility of using individual leaders 
such as warlords and the informal networks that they possess as a unit of analysis. In the case of 
Mozambique a key question remains why and how RENAMO after twenty years was able to 
remobilise its ex-combatants, what incentivised this and what does this tell us about post-conflict 
peace building?  
My writings on Angola and Mozambique also contrast significantly with the findings from 
the West Africa academic literature of Utas (2012) on Big Men networks and Reno’s (2000) 
pessimistic conclusion that the destruction of war time militia networks has failed and leads to 
criminal networks that do not provide long term stability. I demonstrate that this has not been the 
experience of Angola and Mozambique post-conflict and illustrates that we should not over 
generalise from the West African and Central African examples as Reno (2000) and Clapham (1998) 
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have done. There is also a danger of over generalising about Angola and Mozambique when in fact 
significant differences exist in how both conflicts developed and ended. 
 Mozambique 
My analysis on RENAMO in the 1990s stand up well when tested by recent research on 
RENAMO during the period 1977-1992.  In the first comprehensive study of RENAMO since my 1996 
book Emerson agrees with my thesis that RENAMO became addicted to Rhodesian and later South 
African Defence Force support (Emerson 2013). He concludes that RENAMO’s military effectiveness 
for much of its existence was largely rooted in its Rhodesian and South African patrimony, adherence 
to a guerrilla warfare strategy, strong command and control and a steady source of war material.  
Emerson confirms what the reviewers of my book questioned, that RENAMO only tried to 
define its own political identity in the late 1980s, once it had to survive largely on its own. Likewise he 
follows my interpretation that attempts by the South Africans to hand-pick and manipulate the 
political leadership stymied the natural growth of a strong political leadership within RENAMO’s 
guerrilla ranks – which is a handicap to this day. It also meant that the insurgents were never able to 
mobilize and politicize the population until after the Rome General Peace Accord in 1992 (Vines 
2014).  
With hindsight I can now see that though in 1991 I identified the importance of radio 
equipment for RENAMO’s command and control, I missed that when their batteries failed in 1989, 
RENAMO’s battle field success also suffered and that this provided an opening for mediation - like 
the offer of satellite phones by the Italian mediators in 1991 in exchange for progress in the Rome 
peace talks.  
My International Peacekeeping article also highlighted that post-conflict interventions 
should not be seen as solely technical processes, but need to be deeply political. The success of the 
UN in Mozambique, as I show was due to the UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello’s political reading 
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of the situation in 1993-94 and an understanding of his limitations. What I did not forsee is that 
twenty years on RENAMO could still access stocks of weapons and draw upon a network of ex-
combatants that were able to resume limited armed conflict in 2013-14.    
My book on RENAMO and the paper on disarmament in Mozambique was (one of) the first 
to make clear that especially conflict fatigue but also the UN DDR strategy successfully degraded 
RENAMO’s military command and control structures through a ‘pay them and scatter’ approach to 
demobilization. In short reintegration actually worked rather well in Mozambique and ex-combatants 
have successfully reintegrated and the group did not have the capacity to return to full war. 
What neither I nor others have yet understood is the post-war relationships of RENAMO’s 
low – and mid -ranked veterans and their relationship to RENAMO’s leadership. Studies in West 
Africa, show that long-after conflict is over military networks are involved in a myriad of activities 
such as election campaigning, illicit trade, private security, mining and criminality. These studies 
suggest these structures are not just based on former military structures but are shaped by 
patronage relationships (see Christensen and Utas 2008; Themnér 2012) but this has yet to be tested 
in the Mozambique context. 
I argue in my International Peacekeeping article that RENAMO has been incompetent as a 
political party and has not been able to adapt to peacetime Mozambican politics. The personality and 
paranoia of Dhlakama has contributed to this – with his expulsion of talent. My future research may 
well benefit from the Big Man network analysis from West Africa in deepening my explanation as to 
why despite rapidly degrading fortunes Dhlakama could still remobilize ageing ex-combatants, 20 
years after the Mozambican conflict ended because of patronage politics.  Nikkie Wiegink (2015 
forthcoming) argues that I have downplayed the relationships of dependency between Dhlakama and 
his followers. Wiegink says there are some 3,000 RENAMO ex-combatants living in Maringue district 
in central Mozambique (although this actually should be described as all of Sofala province) and they 
have been ‘waiting’ for the party to provide them benefits. This may be true and if so confirms that 
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Mozambique’s politics are localised and that whilst RENAMO was unable to return to full conflict, its 
structures remained intact enough in central Mozambique to return to limited violence.  
Beyond frustrated ex-combatants why did, despite its inability to deliver, RENAMO win 37.8 
percent of the vote in 1994 and 38.8% in the 1999 elections? There are even suggestions that 
Dhlakama may have won the presidential vote in 1999 (but denied through electoral fraud), giving 
FRELIMO the fright of its life and explaining the subsequent closing of democratic space in 
Mozambique. Carrie Manning (2002), as I cite in my International Peacekeeping article, already noted 
the decline of RENAMO in 1995, so it maybe that this vote was more of a protest vote against 
FRELIMO, rather than support for Dhlakama and RENAMO. My work has however identified the likely 
future challenges for RENAMO. When I interviewed Dhlakama in September 2010 in Nampula, his 
greatest concern was not FRELIMO, but MDM. It seems that Mozambique is moving gradually from 
liberation politics and the growing urban middle classes are seeking an alternative to vote for. As 
happened in Zimbabwe with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and in Angola with the 
emergence of the Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola - Coligação Eleitoral (CASA-CE), are we 
seeing the slow decline of Liberation Movements?  
My understanding is that RENAMO has probably calculated that it will continue to decline 
and that its best chance of slowing that decline is to seek agreement with FRELIMO and thereby 
jointly challenge MDM.  After 74 rounds of talks since late 2012, RENAMO in late August 2014 finally 
signed a new ceasefire and Dhlakama returned to Maputo in early September 2014 to endorse the 
agreement with President Guebuza.  Dhlakama has obtained concessions over politicisation of the 
electoral system and additional jobs in the military. There will be international observers to monitor 
the peace and RENAMO has obtained an amnesty for crimes committed during recent fighting 
backdated to March 2012. Although this agreement provides the basis for RENAMO to campaign for 
the 15 October 2014 presidential and parliamentary elections, the negotiations will still continue. 
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Unresolved is the transfer of ‘residual forces of Renamo’ into the army and the police, funds for 
RENAMO and reducing FRELIMO party influence in the state.  
This agreement accords with a recurrent pattern that I highlighted in my publications on 
RENAMO – namely that Dhlakama has been unable to adapt to non-violent pluralistic politics. As he 
has tried to maintain Big Men linkages, he has needed to extract concessions through targeted 
violence, bluster and threats. This in the short term will have strengthened Dhlakama’s position but 
the key test will be the presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2014 and how strong 
RENAMO’s vote is, or whether there continues to be a swing towards MDM.   
The municipal elections of 2013 were boycotted by RENAMO resulting in MDM winning four 
of the 53 contested municipalities and also securing 40 per cent of the votes both in the capital, 
Maputo and Matola. The emergence of MDM in the south in this manner is something RENAMO 
never achieved. Why RENAMO has been so inept at building itself up, especially at local government 
level remains a research question to be answered. What also needs further research is why RENAMO 
felt it needed to tactically return to limited armed conflict in October 2012. My initial conclusions 
have suggested that the answer lies in its leadership, growing frustration of its ex-combatants in 
central Mozambique, fuelled possibly by rising national expectations of natural resource 
endowments windfalls but also the introduction in 2011 of new legislation in which the government 
recognised the right of war veterans to a pension. Although in typical fashion RENAMO voted against 
this in the National Assembly, RENAMO veterans in theory benefit but obtaining the pension is a 
lengthy and frustrating process that can take several years – heightening a sense of discrimination, as 
RENAMO veterans are often lacking even the basic education to navigate such processes.  
My analysis is that the re-integration of RENAMO ex-combatants should be seen as an open-
ended long-term process that is not just technical and includes political inclusion. This, I argue, 
suggests that there is a need for strategies to accommodate clusters of combatants that remain 
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structured around mid- low level commanders. Helping the Mozambican government to effectively 
distribute veteran pensions (such as 600 Meticais per month – about £14), could be one of those. 
My unique contribution among scholarship is that I have regularly interviewed key players in 
Mozambique over twenty years, including Presidents Chissano and Guebuza, Afonso Dhlakama, Raul 
Domingos, Aldo Ajello, Bishop Sengulane, Mario Raffaeli, José Pacheco and many others. This has 
provided insights to test other scholars and commentators work. I have come to conclude that  
Dhlakama was a good tactical commander for RENAMO during the civil war but never a strategic one 
and that he became increasingly insecure in peacetime. The role of individual high-level commanders 
and their inability to accept elite peaceful re-integration needs scholarly attention. There is a body of 
research now on mid and lower level commanders but we lack sufficient methodological tools to 
assess the role of elite individuals and their potential to spoil post conflict agreements. My article in 
International Peacekeeping suggests that elite level reintegration is equally important to ensure 
lasting peace. 
 Angola 
My publications on Angola, likewise show how UNITA has evolved over time from being fully 
supported by apartheid South Africa and the second largest recipient of covert aid from the US 
government to having by the mid- 1990s to survive on its own.  
On the one hand UNITA is different from RENAMO, in that it was a nationalist movement in 
the 1960s, and it was led by a charismatic leader - Jonas Savimbi. On the other hand it shared with 
RENAMO significant covert support which in its case only ended in the late 1990s, when it had to 
become increasingly predatory. My interviews with Angolan refugees and internally displaced from 
1995-99 illustrate this shift, with UNITA becoming increasingly dependent on the diamond trade to 
fund its operations. These field work insights complement the work of Reno (2000) who also noticed 
a shift to predatory behaviour in West Africa as Cold War sources of support dried up.  
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My monograph Angola Unravels highlights the horrors of civil war in Angola – which I 
witnessed at first hand - and the international efforts to mediate but also encourage and finally force 
an end of the conflict through UN sanctions. Though researching in a hot war zone is never easy, it 
enabled me to observe first- hand the limitations of international mediation.  My conclusion was 
then and still is (see Guyot C. and Vines, A. chapters in The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping 
Operations, forthcoming 2015) that the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) only 
worked because there was Angolan political will for it. On reflection I believe a weakness of Angola 
Unravels was that it tried to place a neo-liberal human rights thesis to the Angolan conflict as some 
reviewers have suggested. As Marcus Power (Power 2001: 499) observed: ‘Four decades of conflict 
would seem to suggest, however, there is no ‘key’ to this particular conflict’. Yet Power drew on the 
research and recommendations of my monograph to highlight that complexity and argue for a much 
more detailed study of the political economy of Angola (Power 2001: 499). Such a book has yet to be 
written. 
The analysis of Angola Unravels drew upon field data gathered from 1995-99 and was widely 
cited by scholarship and policy makers trying to understand the dynamics of the Angolan conflict. I 
provided a detailed account of the collapse of the Lusaka peace process, its drivers and the return to 
war. The academic journal reviews of the monograph all recognised this important contribution 
including my primary source access to policy makers, government and rebel officials, NGOs and 
refugees and internationally displaced. I also wrote a series of further scholarly contributions that 
built upon research in this monograph, such as on civil society in Angola (Kibble and Vines 2001), on 
the failure of UN sanctions in Angola (Vines 2004); showing that Paul Colliers’ greed theory is not 
applicable to Angola (Ganesan and Vines 2004) and on the limitations of UN operations in Angola 
(Guyot and Vines, forthcoming 2015). 
No one else conducted field work including in rebel controlled areas and published primary 
data in this manner. My monograph remains an important source of primary data on the Angolan 
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conflict and Stephen Weigert (2011) in his account of Angola’s thirty years of war cites my work 
extensively on the post 1992 period. Weigert argues that Savimbi got caught trying to merge 
revolutionary ideology with pragmatic military and political goals and is one of the few other scholars 
with Guimarães (2002) to evaluate the importance of Jonas Savimbi for UNITA. From this perspective 
of ours it was no surprise that after Savimbi was killed by government forces on 22 February 2002, 
the government quickly made a unilateral declaration of truce and offered to allow UNITA to 
reorganize and integrate into national political life and enjoy an amnesty. On 4 April 2002 the Luena 
Memorandum of Understanding was formally signed in Luanda – officially ending the war.  
As quickly as May 2002 – some 85 percent of UNITA’s military had gathered at 
demobilisation camps. This was in stark contrast to previous attempts at DDR in Angola. In the 
Angola Unravels monograph and in the chapter I wrote on reintegration of UNITA in Angola I show 
that it is not only about getting DDR mechanics right. Political will is essential. My research 
highlighted that plenty of resources were given to UNAVEM III, when it was deployed in 1995 to 
assist the Lusaka Protocols, nevertheless the operation still failed and repeated the mistakes of 1991-
1992. It was only the death of Savimbi and UNITA’s effective military defeat that the war came to an 
end. I show in my chapter ‘Beyond Bullets and Ballots’ on the Angola DDR process that it was ‘dogged 
with logistical problems’, disarmament was patchy and reintegration difficult, but it was successful 
because returning to war is no longer an option. This chapter remains the most up-to-date academic 
assessment on Angolan DDR and reintegration.  
As Berdal and Ucko (2009: 6) concluded about my research on UNITA DDR and reintegration, 
this case study offers a critical lesson that DDR programmes, however well designed and resourced, 
can never carry ‘peace processes’ on their own but must, if they are to be successful, form part of 
wider political process’. One implication of this highlighted in both my work on Mozambique and 




A critical reflection using an appropriate methodology, model or theory on the candidate’s 
development as a research practitioner  
My understanding of the insurgencies of Angola and Mozambique developed over time. My 
field work in Angola from 1992 to 2002 and in Mozambique from 1985 to 1992 was conducted during 
armed conflict. Although this allowed me to observe the conflicts at first hand, and see both armed 
groups in operation, only with peace and time have I been able to place these groups in a broader 
theoretical context. My professional experience in West Africa has also assisted this, and the growing 
academic literature on War Lords and Big Men networks that have increasingly been used to examine 
the limitations of DDR. 
My research was greatly assisted by moving from an NGO advocacy organisation that tried 
to explain politics through a liberal democracy, human rights paradigm. Political accountability and 
social justice are important but understanding the political economy, incentives, networks and 
trading for peace processes and settlement more so as De Waal has argued (2009).  
I have been advantaged by having access to many leadership level interviews in Angola and 
Mozambique, but although I visited Nampula, Mozambique in 2010 and central Angola in 2004 – the 
rest of my interviews have been in Maputo and Luanda or outside both countries. My International 
Peacekeeping article on RENAMO failed to interview RENAMO ex-combatants in central Mozambique 
and hence failed to spot the regional variation that Wiegink (2013) has analysed. 
My research on Mozambique could have benefited from looking more deeply at elite 
habituation and examining how formal electoral contests are supplemented by informal interactions. 
It does seem that twenty years after the end of the civil war RENAMO has not wanted to drop the 
rough parity it enjoys as an armed group. RENAMO has consistently sought to benefit through 
informal networks as it is singularly ill equipped to compete in formal political structures.  The game 
changer is that the growing middle class and urban poor is challenging this logic – and support is 
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shifting to MDM (and CASA-CE in Angola). How this breaks the dualistic political norm that has 
determined Mozambique and Angolan politics since 1992 needs to be further researched.  
Full statements on the extent of the contributions of all other persons where some or all of the 
outputs submitted are collaborative 
The research was carried personally and these publications except for submission 4 (‘Beyond bullets 
and ballots’) are single authored.  Bereni Oruitemeka was the second author. She was an intern at 
Chatham House and I commissioned her to review my past writings on Angola and provide a 
template from that material to write a journal article. I then crafted it and conducted the research. I 
was fully responsible for the updated book chapter as she had left Chatham House for employment 
elsewhere. 
Conclusion and suggestions for future work 
Already in May 1997 RENAMO used protests in five provinces to intimidate the government 
and seek concessions.  RENAMO’s core problem is that it has failed to deliver promises made to the 
public during war time and has no independent source of funding to maintain itself. RENAMO was ill 
prepared for peace and as my research showed, has been poorly equipped to compete in a formal 
political process. If it had changed leader, could this have been different? As has been demonstrated 
recently in Zimbabwe with the dramatic decline of the MDC, quality of leadership and strategy in the 
competition against a dominant party counts (until the MDC won 99 seats in the 2009 elections, 
RENAMO was the largest opposition party in Africa).   
Afonso Dhlakama has likened RENAMO’s struggle for power to the pain of a woman in birth 
– but twenty years is a long time to wait. The recent violence in Mozambique was a desperate ploy to 
seek compensation through an elite bargain. The August 2014 agreement will in the short term 
strengthen Dhlakama’s hand, but this could be weakened if RENAMO loses significant seats in the 
October 2014 elections. The rise of MDM and the threat it poses to both the established parties 
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requires further research. The question now arises as to whether this alternative actually encourages 
greater democratic reversal in Mozambique? 
Angola has shown a different trajectory from Mozambique. When UNITA’s leader was killed 
in 2002 it looked as if UNITA subsequently would become a marginalised force. Indeed the hegemony 
of the dominant party (the MPLA) has not yet been challenged, but the 2012 legislative elections do 
suggest a small UNITA rebound. Defeated on the battlefield (unlike RENAMO), UNITA has 
acknowledged it needs to re-craft itself and also create its own networks and businesses to sustain 
itself.  
Similar to the MDM in Mozambique, a new political coalition (CASA-CE) is also starting to 
erode the support base of the MPLA and attract youth and urban middle class voters. It is too early to 
assess what this means longer term and the failure of MDC in Zimbabwe is a salutary lesson, but the 
research question for Angola is whether we are seeing the slow death of liberation movements that 
Southall (2013) believes is occurring?  
In the near future I intend to use this research base to write a journal article comparing the 
fortunes of RENAMO and UNITA and adding to the academic debate on War Lord Democrats – as the 
West Africa and DRC models do not match my findings.  I have also drafted a chapter on RENAMO for 
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